




Directors' Remuneration Policy of International Consolidated Airlines Group



# 2024 Directors' Remuneration Policy

### **2024 Directors' Remuneration Policy**

This document sets out the Directors' Remuneration Policy of International Consolidated Airlines Group which was approved at the 2024 Shareholders' Meeting. This Policy replaces the Directors' Remuneration Policy approved at the 2021 Shareholders' Meeting and amended at the 2022 Shareholders' Meeting.

This Director' Remuneration Policy is adapted to the wording of article 529 novodecies of the Capital Companies Act, as amended by Law 5/2021 of 12 April, and shall apply, in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of said article 529 novodecies, from the date of its approval by the 2024 Shareholders' Meeting and during the following three financial years. Any amendment or replacement thereof during such period shall require the prior approval of the Shareholders' Meeting in accordance with the procedure established for its approval. Although IAG, as a Spanish-incorporated company, is not subject to the remuneration reporting regulations that apply to UK-incorporated companies, it is firmly committed to UK best practice and will continue to operate in accordance with the UK remuneration reporting regulations.

In developing the proposed Directors' Remuneration Policy, input was received from the Remuneration Committee and management while ensuring that conflicts of interest were suitably mitigated. Input was also provided by the Remuneration Committee's appointed independent advisers throughout the process.

#### **IAG Remuneration Principles**

Alignment	Our remuneration policies promote long-term value creation, through transparent alignment with our corporate strategy.		
Simplicity and clarity	We will keep our remuneration structures as simple and clear as possible to ensure they are understandable and meaningful to employees and shareholders.		
Competitiveness	Total remuneration will be competitive for the role, taking into account scale, sector, complexity of responsibility and geography. When setting senior executive pay, we will consider experience, external pay relativity, and the ability of IAG to compete for global talent.		
Pay for performance We promote a culture where all employees are accountable for delivering perform will ensure there is alignment between performance and pay outcomes, with fair supported by corporate and individual performance and wider stakeholder experi- Depending on the level of the individual in the organisation, we use long-term equincentivise performance, shareholder value creation, and retention. Performance and targets will seek to balance collective success with a clear line of sight for par Remuneration outcomes aim to reflect the sustained long-term underlying perfor- IAG.			
Judgement	We will use discretion and judgement to review formulaic performance outcomes to arrive fair and balanced remuneration outcomes for both IAG and employees.		
Sustainability Our remuneration policies incentivise individual and corporate performance, support attraction and retention and promote sound risk management to enhance the sustair long-term financial health of the Group. Individual contribution and values and behav be reflected in remuneration outcomes.			
Wider workforce	We are committed to understanding the experience of all our colleagues. When setting senior executive pay we will use this insight to ensure all decisions regarding executive remuneration reflect the experience and expectations of all stakeholders.		

#### **Consideration of shareholder views**

The Company consults regularly with its major investors on all matters relating to executive remuneration. The Company will engage in an extensive investor consultation exercise whenever there are any significant changes to remuneration policy.

In developing our approach to our Director's Remuneration Policy review, we consulted with our major shareholders and main proxy advisory bodies. No concerns were raised with our Policy proposal, and we received valuable questions and feedback which will help shape our future discussions.

The Committee discusses each year the issues and outcomes from the annual Shareholders' Meeting, and determines any appropriate action required as a result.

# Consideration of employment conditions elsewhere in the Group

The Committee is updated on pay and conditions of the employees within the Group and takes this into account when considering executive directors' remuneration. The Board is committed to understanding the experience of all our employees and uses its insight to ensure all decisions regarding executive remuneration reflect the experience and expectations of all stakeholders.

The pay of employees across all companies in the Group is taken into account when determining the level of any increase in the annual salary review of directors. This normally takes place each year at the January Committee meeting.

When determining the RSP awards for executive directors, the Committee takes note of the eligibility criteria and the potential size of awards for executives below director level in all companies within the Group.

At the operating company level, the Company consults with employee representative bodies, including trade unions and works councils. This includes consultation on company strategy, the competitive environment, and employee terms and conditions. In addition, some of the operating companies run employee opinion surveys in order to take into consideration employee views on a variety of subjects, including leadership, management, and the wider employee experience.

The IAG European Works Council (EWC) facilitates communication and consultation between employees and management on transnational European matters. It includes representatives from the different European Economic Area (EEA) countries, meeting regularly throughout the year to be informed and where appropriate, consulted on transnational matters impacting employees in two or more EEA countries.

#### **Changes to Directors' Remuneration Policy**

After a detailed review of the current Directors' Remuneration Policy the Committee has concluded that the existing policy continues to provide the most appropriate framework for aligning executive and shareholder interests at this current time. As IAG returns to strong sustainable performance, the Committee believes there will be a time when it is appropriate to incentivise our CEO and his team to deliver our long-term financial and sustainability ambitions through robust long-term incentive targets. It is therefore our intention to keep our long-term incentive model under review to ensure that it continues to remain effective. We will consult with shareholders (and seek approvals as required) in the next three years to the extent that any changes are proposed.

While the Directors' Remuneration Policy structure and framework has been retained, some minor Policy amendments have been approved to ensure that we remain competitive over the short term, as outlined below:

- Approach to annual bonus deferral: under our 2021 remuneration policy, any annual bonus earned is paid 50% in cash, with 50% deferred into shares for three years. This deferral has been an important way of increasing personal shareholdings and satisfying the Group's minimum shareholding requirements of 350% of salary for the CEO. Recognising that our control mechanism for ensuring alignment with shareholder interests is the minimum shareholding requirement itself, and that the minimum shareholding requirement can be fully met without the reliance on annual bonus deferral, under our 2024 remuneration policy the Committee is proposing that the bonus deferral is rebalanced from 50% to 20% of any annual bonus earned deferred into shares, subject to the executive meeting their minimum shareholding requirement. The remaining 80% of the annual bonus earned will be paid in cash. The deferral rate will remain at 50% until the minimum shareholding requirement is met; and
- If a broad-based employee share plan is implemented, Executive Directors will be able to participate on the same basis as other employees.

The Policy as shown on the following pages is intended to apply for three years, until 2027, taking effect from the date of approval.

### Key elements of pay

### **Executive directors**

The Company's Policy remains to attract, retain and motivate its leaders and to ensure they are focused on delivering business priorities within a framework designed to promote the long-term success of IAG, aligned with stakeholder interests. The table below illustrates the components of pay and time period of each element of the Policy for Executive Directors.

Total pay over 5 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Fixed Remuneration	Salary, benefits and pension	•			
Annual Incentive (Malus and clawback provisions apply)	50% in cash <sup>1</sup>	50% in shares <sup>1</sup> - T No further perforr	hree-year deferral pe mance conditions	riod.	•
	1 Where the IAG CEO 20% deferred into sh		eholding guideline then	80% of the award will be	e paid out in cash with
Long-term Incentive (Malus and clawback provisions apply)	Up to 150% of sala Three-year vesting			Two-year holding No further perforr	
Shareholder requirements		s' minimum shareho	lding requirement (in	cluding post-cessatic	on requirements)

The table below summarises the main elements of remuneration packages for the executive directors:

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation of element of policy	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics
Base salary To attract and retain talent to help achieve our strategic objectives	Takes account of factors such as role, skills and contribution. The positioning of base salaries is set with reference to factors such as the external market, as well as the individual's skills and contribution. Base salaries are normally reviewed annually, and normally take effect on 1 January each year.	Base salaries are normally reviewed annually by the Remuneration Committee by taking into account factors such as: company affordability, the value and worth of the executive, retention risks, and the size of pay increases generally across the wider workforce.	Individual and business performance are considered in reviewing and setting base salary.
Benefits Ensures total package is competitive	Benefits include, but are not limited to, life insurance, personal travel and, where applicable, a company car, fuel, and private health insurance. Executive directors may also participate in any broad-based employee share plans that may be operated by the Company on the same basis as other eligible employees. Where appropriate, benefits may include relocation, international assignment costs and tax advisory services. Executives will also be reimbursed for all reasonable expenses.	There is no formal maximum. In general, the Company expects to maintain benefits at the current level. The maximum value for any broad-based employee plans will be in line with the maximum value for eligible employees.	
Pension Provides post- retirement remuneration and ensures total package is competitive	The Company operates a defined contribution scheme as a percentage of salary, and all executive directors are eligible for membership. Executives can opt instead to receive a salary supplement in lieu of a pension (in full or in part).	The level of employer contribution for executive directors, expressed as a percentage of basic salary, will be in line with the rate applicable to the majority of the workforce in the country in which the executive director is based. For the UK workforce, this is currently 12.5% of basic salary.	

Purpose and
link to strategy

## Annual incentive award

Incentivises the delivery of annual KPIs and strategic objectives

Up to 200% of salary				
Y1	Y2	¥.3	Y4	Y5
Pai	d in	cas	sh	
Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5
Def	erre	ed		
Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5

#### Operation of element of policy

The Board, on a recommendation from the Remuneration Committee, sets the measures and targets that apply to the annual incentive award which are normally measured over a single financial year. These are set by reference to a number of factors, including the Business Plan (as approved by the Board), and the Group's strategic focus.

The Board, after considering the recommendation of the Committee, retains the discretion to adjust the formulaic outcome of awards in order to, in its opinion, properly reflect overall corporate performance – see the 'Information supporting the policy tables' section.

Once the minimum shareholding requirement is met, 20% of the annual incentive award is normally deferred into shares which will normally be released after a period of three years.

Where the executive has not met their minimum shareholding requirement, 50% of the annual incentive award is normally deferred into shares which will normally be released after a period of three years.

On vesting, executives will receive the benefit of any dividends paid over the deferred period in the form of dividend equivalent payments.

Malus and clawback provisions apply – see the 'Information supporting the policy tables' section.

#### The maximum opportunity in the incentive plan is 200% of salary. Each performance metric in the incentive plan is independent. For each performance metric in the incentive plan. there will normally be no payment at all until performance for that particular metric has reached the threshold level of the target range. 50% of the maximum will be awarded for on-target performance, and the maximum for each element will only be awarded once a stretch target has been reached.

Maximum opportunity

Performance metrics

The majority of the annual incentive is subject to financial measures. Measurable non-financial measures may include, but are not limited to, strategic, personal, customer and ESG objectives.

For the bonus deferral award, no other performance conditions apply because it is based on performance already delivered.

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation of element of policy	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics
Restricted Share Plan (RSP)	The RSP consists of an award of the Company's shares which normally	The face value of the award(s) will not exceed	No performance measures are associated with the awards.
Incentivises long-term shareholder value creation, and retention. Up to 150% of salary Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 5-year vesting + holding period Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5	vests as long as the executive remains employed by the Company at the time of vesting and subject to the assessment of the underpin. Malus and clawback provisions apply - see the 'Information supporting the policy tables' section. Following the assessment of the underpin, there is normally an additional holding period of at least two years.	150% of salary in respect of any financial year.	Vesting will be contingent on the satisfaction of a discretionary underpin, normally assessed over three financial years commencing from the financial year in which the award was granted. In assessing the underpin, the Committee will consider the Company's overall performance, including financial and non-financial performance, as well as any material risk or regulatory failures identified. Financial performance may include elements such as revenue, profitability, cash generation, return on capital and benchmarked with comparable airlines. Non-financial performance may include a range of operational and strategic measures critical to the Company's long-term sustainable success. Whilst the RSP provides a greater certainty of reward by its very nature, the Committee will ensure any value delivered to executive directors is fair and appropriate in the context of the performance of the business and experience of our stakeholders and that corporate or individual failure is not rewarded. In the case of significant failure on the part of the Company or the individual, vesting may be reduced, including to nil. Full disclosure of the Committee's considerations in assessing the underpin

will be disclosed in the relevant Directors' Remuneration Report.

#### Information supporting the policy tables Shareholding requirements

In order to increase alignment with shareholders, executive directors are required to build up a minimum personal shareholding equal to a set percentage of base salary. The share price used to calculate the guideline is either the share price on the date of award or on the date of vesting/exercise. Executive directors will be required to retain the entire 100% of shares (net of tax) which vest from share plans until their respective shareholding requirement is attained. The IAG CEO is required to build up and maintain a shareholding of 350% of basic salary, and other executive directors (to the extent they are appointed to the Board) are required to build up and maintain a shareholding of 200% of basic salary.

On departure, executive directors will be required to hold the number of shares in line with their in-employment shareholding requirement (or the number of shares that they own at departure if lower) for two years from the date they step down from the Board. Shares will normally be retained in the nominee account administered by the Company to ensure this.

#### Choice of performance measures

The performance measures selected for the annual bonus are ordinarily set on an annual basis by the Committee, to ensure that they remain appropriate to reflect the priorities for the Company in the year ahead. The targets for the performance measures are set taking into account a number of factors, including the Company's annual operating plan, strategic priorities, the economic environment and market conditions and expectations. Non-financial annual bonus measures may include strategic, personal, customer and ESG objectives.

#### Malus and clawback provisions

Malus and clawback provisions	Circumstances	The Board, following the advice of the Committee, has authority to reduce or cancel awards before they are satisfied (and/or impose additional conditions on awards), and to recover payments, if special circumstances exist. These special circumstances include (but are not limited to):
		• Fraud;
		<ul> <li>Material breach of any law, regulation or code of practice;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>An error or a material misstatement of results leading to overpayment or over-allocation;</li> <li>Misconduct;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Failure of risk management;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>The occurrence of an exceptional event affecting the Company's value or reputation;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Payments based on results that are subsequently found to be materially financially inaccurate or misleading;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Serious reputational damage as a result of a participant's behaviour;</li> </ul>
		Corporate failure; and
		<ul> <li>Any other circumstances in which the Board considers it to be in the interests of shareholders for the award to lapse or be adjusted.</li> </ul>
	Period	<ul> <li>For the cash element of the annual incentive plan, clawback provisions apply for three years from the date of payment;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>For the bonus deferral awards, there will be three years from the date of award in which shares can be withheld, i.e. the entire period from the date of the award until vesting;</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>For RSP, clawback provisions apply for two years post vesting; and</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>The proportion of an award to be withheld or recovered will be at the discretion of the Board, upon consideration of the Committee, taking into account all relevant matters.</li> </ul>

#### Discretion to adjust formulaic outcomes

The Board, after considering the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, retains the discretion to adjust (including preventing them in their entirety and making no payment) the formulaic outcome of incentive award payments in order to, in its opinion, properly reflect overall corporate performance. This includes where the business has had an exceptional event, in particular events that significantly impact stakeholders. This will include analysing the performance of the participant and the underlying financial performance of the Group to check whether they have been satisfactory in the circumstances and whether vesting levels reflect overall corporate performance. The Remuneration Committee can also take other factors it considers relevant into account. Underlying financial performance is defined as the overall performance of the Company, which may be considered with reference to a range of measures as the Remuneration Committee considers most appropriate at the time. Stakeholders would include shareholders, customers, and the Company's workforce. The Board also has authority to reduce the award levels at grant and/or the vesting outcomes for the RSP where the Company has experienced a significant fall in share price, as a result of which it considers that participants have unduly benefited from windfall gains.

#### Benefits, expenses and taxation

The Board may arrange to settle any taxes and associated expenses payable if it deems such settlement appropriate, including, but not limited to tax on benefits or where, without such settlement, the executive will be subject to double taxation on the same remuneration amount.

#### Non-executive directors

The table below summarises the main elements of remuneration for non-executive directors:

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation of element of policy	Maximum opportunity
Basic fees Fees take into account the level of responsibility, experience, abilities and dedication required.	Fees are normally set with reference to factors such as market positioning. To acknowledge the key role of the Chair of the Board of Directors, fees are set separately for this role. Additional fees may be paid for undertaking additional Board responsibilities such as undertaking the role of Senior Independent Director or for holding a Committee chair position. Non-executive director fees will take into account external market conditions to ensure it is possible to attract and retain the necessary talent. There is no specific review date set, but it is the Company's intention to review fees from time to time.	The maximum annual aggregate gross remuneration (including annual basic fees and benefits, including travel benefits) payable to directors shall not exceed €3,500,000 as approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on 19 October 2010, in accordance with article 37.3 of the Company's Bylaws.
Benefits	Non-executive directors (including the Board Chair) are entitled to use air tickets of the airlines of the Company or related to the Company in accordance with the terms and conditions established, from time to time, in the Personal Travel Policy for IAG Non-Executive Directors approved by the Board. As provided for under article 37.8 of the Company's Bylaws and by way of development of that article, this benefit may also be provided to non- executive directors after they have ceased to hold office if the Board considers it appropriate and in accordance with the terms and conditions set out from time to time in the Personal Travel Policy for IAG Non- Executive Directors approved by the Board. The terms and conditions applicable to former non-executive directors may differ from those applicable to current directors and may be subject to additional conditions or restrictions (such as a minimum period of service or a maximum period of entitlement, fixed or variable, after leaving office) as determined by the Board from time to time.	The maximum total annual gross amount of the personal travel benefit is €500,000 for all non-executive directors taken together (including any former non-executive director who may be entitled to this benefit at any given time).


#### **Remuneration scenarios**

The chart below shows the potential total remuneration for the Executive Director in respect of the application of our Remuneration Policy. The scenarios illustrated include the minimum remuneration receivable, the remuneration receivable if the director performs in line with the Company's expectations, the maximum remuneration receivable, and the maximum remuneration receivable with 50% share price growth. With the exception of the illustration showing 50% share price growth, no share price variation is taken into consideration in these scenarios.

#### IAG CEO - 2024 remuneration scenario assumptions

The assumptions underlying each scenario are described below.

Minimum (fixed	Consists of basic salary, taxable benefits and pension-related benefits					
only)	Basic salary is at 1 January 2024					
	Benefits are valu	led using the figures in	the single figure tak	ple		
	Pensions are val	ued by applying cash a	llowance rate of 12.5	5% of basic salary at 1 J	January 2024	
		Basic Salary (£'000)	Benefits (£'000)	Pension (£'000)	Total fixed (£'000)	
	IAG CEO	887	65	111	1,063	
On-target	If the director performs in line with the Company's expectations.					
	The opportunity for the annual incentive is 100% of basic salary under this scenario.					
	The opportunity for the long-term incentive (RSP) is 150% of basic salary.					
Maximum	The maximum award opportunity for annual incentive is 200% of basic salary under this scenario.					
	The opportunity for the long-term incentive (RSP) is 150% of basic salary.					
Maximum plus share price growth	The same assumptions apply as for 'Maximum' but with a 50% share price appreciation, solely for the purpose of illustrating a wider range of potential remuneration outcomes.					
All scenarios	Euro amounts are shown at the 2023 exchange rate £:€ 1.1486.					
	Long-term incentives consist of share awards only which are measured at face value, i.e. no assumption is made for dividend equivalents which may be payable.					



1 The percentages shown in the chart represent the weight of each element vs the total in each scenario.

# Service contracts and exit payments policy Executive directors

The following is a description of the key terms of the service contracts of executive directors.

The service contracts are available for inspection, on request, at the Company's registered office.

The contracts of executive directors are for an indefinite period.

There are no express provisions in executives' service contracts with the Company for compensation payable upon termination of those contracts, other than for payments in lieu of notice.

Executive director	Date of contract	Notice period
		6 months - from /
Luis Gallego	8 September 2020	12 months – given

The period of notice required from the executive is six months; the period of notice required from the Company is 12 months. Where the Company makes a payment in lieu of notice, a payment becomes payable only if, in the Company's opinion, the executive has taken reasonable steps to find alternative paid work and then only in monthly instalments. The payments will comprise base salary only. The Company may reduce the sum payable in respect of any month by any amount earned by the executive (including salary and benefits) referable to work done in that month (for example, as a result of alternative paid work referred to above).

In the event of an executive's redundancy, compensation, whether in respect of a statutory redundancy payment or a payment in lieu of notice or damages for loss of office, is capped at an amount equal to 12 months' base salary. The Company will honour the contractual entitlements of a terminated director; however, the Company may terminate an executive's service contract with immediate effect and without compensation on a number of grounds including where the executive is incapacitated for 130 days in any 12-month period, becomes bankrupt, fails to perform his or her duties to a reasonable standard, acts dishonestly, is guilty of misconduct or persistent breach of his or her duties, brings the Company into disrepute, is convicted of a criminal offence, is disgualified as a director, refuses to agree to the transfer of his or her service contract where there is a transfer of the business in which he or she is working or ceases to be eligible to work in Spain or the UK (as applicable).

The Committee reserves the right to make any other payments (including, for example, appropriate legal or outplacement fees) in connection with an executive director's cessation of office or employment where the payments are made in good faith in discharge of an existing legal obligation (or by way of damages for breach of such an obligation) or by way of settlement of any claim arising in connection with the cessation of an executive director's office or employment.

Under any of the Company's share plans, save in respect of bonus deferral awards (which will normally vest in full following cessation for any reason) if a director leaves, the Board, after considering the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, may exercise its discretion (within the rules of the schemes) to grant good leaver status. This can be granted in certain circumstances including for example (list not exhaustive) the director leaving for reasons of ill-health, injury or disability, redundancy, retirement or death. Executive directors leaving with good leaver status will normally receive a pro-rata amount of their RSP shares, subject to the underpin being met, in accordance with the plan rules. The pro-ration is normally calculated according to what proportion of the vesting period the executive director spent in company service. Normal vesting dates, holding periods, and post-cessation shareholding guidelines will normally continue to apply, other than in a limited number of exceptional circumstances in accordance with plan rules and/or at the discretion of the Board. If good leaver status is not granted to an executive director, all outstanding awards made to them will normally lapse.

Executive directors leaving with good leaver status are eligible to receive a pro-rata annual incentive payment for the period of the year actually worked, subject to the regular performance assessment and normally paid in the normal manner following the year end.

In the event of an executive director's termination from the Company, they must not be employed by, or provide services to, a restricted business (i.e. an airline or travel business that competes with the Company) for a period of 12 months.

#### **Non-executive directors**

Non-executive directors (including the Chair) do not have service contracts. Their appointment is subject to the Board Regulations and the Company's Bylaws. They do not have the right to any compensation in the event of termination as directors. Board members shall hold office for a period of one year. The non-executive directors' letters of appointment are available for inspection, on request, at the Company's registered office.

#### Notes to the policy tables

The Board may make any remuneration payments and payments for loss of office (and exercise any discretions available to it in connection with such payments) which are not in line with this remuneration policy, where the terms of the payment were agreed (i) before this policy came into effect (provided that they were in line with any applicable directors' remuneration policy in force at the time they were agreed) or (ii) at a time when the relevant individual was not a director of the Company and such payment was not, in the Board's opinion, in consideration of the individual becoming a director. For these purposes 'payments' include the Board satisfying awards of variable remuneration and, in respect of a share award, the terms of the payment are agreed at the time the award is granted. The Board may also make remuneration payments and payments for loss of office outside of the policy set out above if such payments are required by law in a relevant country.

#### **Common award terms**

Awards granted under the share plans may be adjusted in the event of any variation of the Company's share capital or any demerger, special dividend or other event that may affect the current or future value of the awards.

#### External non-executive directorship

The Company's consent is required before an executive can accept an external non-executive appointment and permission is only given in appropriate circumstances. The Company allows the executive to retain any fee from such appointments.

#### Approach to recruitment remuneration

The remuneration for new executive directors will be in line with the policy for current executive directors as far as possible, as expressed in the policy table earlier in this report.

On appointment, new executive directors will have their basic salary set by taking into account factors such as the external market, their peers, and their level of experience. New executive directors will participate in the annual and long-term incentives on the same basis as existing directors.

To facilitate recruitment, the Board, after considering the recommendation of the Committee, may make one-off awards to buy out a candidate's remuneration arrangements that are forfeited as a result of joining the Company. Generally, such buy-out awards will be made on a comparable basis to those forfeited giving due regard to all relevant factors (including value, performance targets, the likelihood of those targets being met and vesting periods). In such circumstances, shareholders will be provided with full details and rationale in the next published remuneration report.

Excluding the value of any potential buy-out, the maximum value of variable remuneration offered at recruitment will be no more than the maxima shown in the remuneration policy table.

In the case of an internal promotion to executive director, the Company will continue to honour any commitments made before promotion.

Other than that, the remuneration arrangements on recruitment will be as above.

Non-executive directors recruited will be remunerated in line with the Company's remuneration policy principles outlined before.